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KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IN THE
LEGAL ACADEMY*
Professor Minow
Thank you. This panel is Kate's idea and I think it is a brilliant
idea. A meeting about constitutional law should dig deeply into the
subject of how legal education frames the roles of lawyers, the
knowledge that is relevant, and actually addresses or fails to
address issues of power.
We have a terrific panel, and since the members' biographies
are in the booklets, I will not take up time by reading them. We
will start with Carrie Menkel-Meadow, who is one of the founders
of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, is an astute
observer of critical legal studies and feminist theory, and engages
in some of the most constructive criticism I know.
Professor Menkel-Meadow
Thank you, Martha. My job is to provide an overview of our
topic in eight to twelve minutes. Thus, I will suggest some
orienting principles.
To me the question of whether and how legal education has
changed and whether there has been a socially appropriate
production of knowledge in the legal academy raises some very
foundational questions.
First of all, production of knowledge relates to the epistemology
of social hierarchies. This means that knowledge in our academy,
the legal academy, is produced by at least several sets of people.
We tend to think of it as faculty production in scholarship and in
* Editor's Note: This panel discussion originally included Professors Anthony
Farley of Boston College Law School, Susan Sturm of Columbia Law School,
and Catherine Krupnick of the Harvard Graduate School of Education. At
publication date, they all declined to publish their remarks.
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classroom discourse. Students, however, also contribute to the
production of knowledge. I will address five different legal reform
efforts I have been involved in with respect to legal education,
many of which started when I was a student. Part of this is about
the notion of empowerment for students, and the way in which
what you learn about an institution is based on your position in that
institution.
Much of what led me to what I do as a legal academic comes
from my experience as a student. As I talk about legal education,
consider other institutions in which you may be situated. I was
recently a patient in a hospital where I was completely depro-
fessionalized and dehumanized, and I saw and experienced what
you learn about a hospital from a patient's perspective, in a manner
you do not usually perceive when you enter as a professional.
I will address five reforms pertaining to legal education.
Legal education is unquestionably more diverse than when I
attended law school thirty years ago, although more needs to be
done in that direction. The infusion of all kinds of different people,
including women, people of color, gays, and disabled persons has
affected in many ways what we study and how we study it. One
can view this change in a positive, optimistic manner. But one can
also be critical of it and ask, for example, why the basic structure
has not changed and why this brand new room in which we are
currently sitting was constructed in the same way as it was when
Langdell came up with his plan for legal education.1 In other
words, one may ask why traditional legal education has strongly
resisted many different efforts at advocating all kinds of progres-
sive other ways of learning.
When I was a law student in the early 1970s, clinical education
did not exist in the law school I attended, but I started my career
as a clinician because I had a wonderful teacher, David Filvaroff,2
'The Langdellian case method and its teaching through the Socratic
"method" in large amphitheater-like rooms debuted in the 1870s. See ROBERT
STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO
THE 1980s 38 (1983).
2 David Filvaroff, Former Dean, Professor of Law, SUNY, Buffalo;
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania (1967-72); former Special
Assistant, U.S. Attorney General (1965-66).
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who taught torts from an experiential perspective. The class was
alternatively a legislature, an executive agency, and a court, and
that was the manner in which we learned about the new possible
tort of "slumlordism. '
3
From learning about new ideas through different methodologies,
I decided that if I ever taught, I would teach experientially about
law, policy, doctrine, and facts from the perspective of a lawyer
playing various roles. I believe clinical education is the most
successful form of education, because it engages us at both
cognitive and behavioral levels. It is also important to note that
most law schools now have clinical education. From a pessimistic
perspective, however, clinical education has not really transformed
the methods of legal teaching.4 In most places it is an add-on.
Most good students now want to apply the knowledge they have
acquired, but there has not been as much integration as I would
like there to be between practical application and legal thought in
the traditional classroom.5
The second movement I believe has changed legal education,
and probably the least successful on my list for incorporation into
traditional legal scholarship and teaching, is law and society or
"socio-legal" studies.6 I was a sociologist before I went to law
school, and, thus, I think of myself as having a sociological
' The tort of "slumlordism" had originally been proposed by Professor
Joseph Sax, then of Michigan Law School, now at Boalt. See Joseph Sax & Fred
J. Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REV. 869 (1967); see also Olin
L. Browder, The Taming of a Duty - The Tort of Liability of Landlords, 81
MICH. L. REV. 99 (1982).
' Clinical education is very successful on its own terms, see Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, The Legacy of Clinical Education: Theories About Lawyering, 29
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 555 (1980), but has not altered more conventional instruction.
See STEVENS, supra note 1, at 212-14.
5 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Problem-Solving Pedagogy Seriously:
A Response to the Attorney General, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 14 (1999).
6 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Durkheimian Epiphanies:The Impor-
tance of Engaged Social Science in Legal Studies, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 91
(1990); David M. Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short Happy Life of the Law
and Society Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 4 (1990); David M. Trubek, The
Place of Law and Social Science in the Structure of Legal Education, 35 J. OF
LEGAL EDUC. 483 (1985).
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
perspective when I talk about the epistemology of social hierarchies
in institutions. I think one's position, class, or gender affects
everything that one does.
Social theory is most often simulated as policy in law school
classes. But adaptation and use of social science methods and
social theory have not been rigorous, except if law and economics
is added to that category, which I would not do, despite recent
attempts to add "behavioral science" to law and economics.7
The third movement I wish to address briefly is critical legal
studies ("CLS").8 I attended the first CLS meeting in 1977, and I
have been "involved" with the movement since its inception
(though it seems quiescent at the moment). What we have learned
from this movement is both a traditional Marxist class examination
of law and legal doctrine, and the important principle of indetermi-
nacy and manipulability of the law and legal doctrines. 9
I think even non-critics have assimilated the heritage of the
CLS movement into their teaching. In fact, a critique of legal
studies would be the idea that exploring the indeterminacy of texts
and "deconstructing" doctrine, which is what most CLS law review
articles do, is actually quite congruent with very traditional legal
scholars and has not added to the possible diversity of legal method
(such as more use of empirical study of the law). 10
7 See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88
CAL. L. REv. 1051 (2000).
8 See generally Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (1987);
Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to Its Origins and
Underpinnings, 36 J. LEGAL EDUc. 505 (1986).
9 See Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L.
REv. 1 (1984).
10 See, e.g., Frank Munger & Carroll Seron, Critical Legal Studies versus
Critical Legal Theory: A Comment on Method, 6 LAW AND POL'Y 257 (1984);
David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism,
36 STAN. L. REv. 575 (1984).
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The fourth movement I want to discuss is legal feminism."
Again I would say this has had a positive impact on legal educa-
tion. I vicw both feminism and critical race studies as innovations
in legal education originating from students.
Women holding seminars in legal education introduced the idea
that the law did not speak to our experience. With few exceptions
originating from great thinkers, topics such as reproduction, the
reconstitution of rape doctrine, employment discrimination, criminal
law, and family law really came from students attending seminars
and wishing to reconstruct seminars using the methodology of
consciousness-raising groups. Those students have changed the
methods and subject matter of legal teaching. 2
I would even go further in saying that these students had the
most profound effect on the law itself via the exploration of
different methodologies, the re-framing of legal issues and the
innovations of new legal theories. Students like Catherine MacKin-
non 3 have made a difference by taking new legal theories con-
structed in the classroom out into the world.
The fifth movement I will address today is law and litera-
ture. 4 I think the importance of law and literature, critical race
theory, and similar movements has been to bring story telling and
narrative back into the law school. Once again, there is a pessimis-
tic view of the import of these movements, which is that we are
" See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mainstreaming Feminist Legal Theory, 23
PAC. L.J. 1493 (1992); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Women's Ways of "Knowing"
Law: Feminist Legal Epistemology, Pedagogy and Jurisprudence, in BILENKY ET
AL., KNOWLEDGE, DIFFERENCE AND POWER (1996).
12 See Cynthia G. Bowman & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Feminist Legal
Theory, Feminist Lawmaking, and the Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
249 (1998).
13 While still a law student, Catherine MacKinnon began her path breaking
work on sexual harassment and new legal theories. See, e.g., CATHERINE A.
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987);
CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SExuAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979); CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989).
14 See, e.g., JAMES BOYD WHITE, ACTS OF HOPE: CREATING AUTHORITY IN
LITERATURE, LAW AND POLITICS 9 (1994); ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE,
AUTHORITY, AND LAW 89 (1993).
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telling other kinds of stories. They are not the stories that appellate
courts necessarily tell, or recognize. The overall impact of these
movements on legal education, however, has been very profound.
When I was a student, to talk anecdotally about one's own
experience was absolutely taboo. That is no longer true. When one
attends a meeting now and hears another's story of injustice, one is
inevitably moved by it.
The interesting and optimistic part of these movements is to see
what the future holds, in particular, regarding the continuing
scholarly debate about whether stories and narrative are verifiable
and statistically significant in the old law and society ways. 15 But
I think that these movements, at least, have placed a different kind
of discourse in the law school classroom and, when used properly,
empower students to criticize the discourse that is otherwise
controlled by us, the teachers.
Finally, I would like to address the Alternative Dispute
Resolution ("ADR") movement. 16 I have been associated with this
movement, labeled as the new approach to legal problem solving,
for fifteen years. The ADR movement relates to broad conceptions
of problems solved in legal environments, legal institutions, law
schools, court houses, and other places. The ADR movement also
addresses whether processes other than litigation would produce
better results. Further, the problem with traditional legal epistemol-
ogy is the mismatch of the courtroom's narrow, binary solutions to
complex, real world problems with multi-party, multi-issue,
competing world views, and competing groups.
At least four foundations are now funding efforts to address
how problem solving and dispute resolution can be integrated and
incorporated into the classroom in law schools to broaden the
different expertise that we bring to bear on solving a legal or social
"5 Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971
(1991). Cf Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School:
An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993).
16 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets
Disputes of its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REV.
1871 (1997); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Dispute Resolution: The Periphery
Becomes the Core: A Review, 69 JUDICATURE 300 (1986) (reviewing STEPHEN
B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985)).
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problem. Optimistically, studying the different movements I have
addressed is very exciting and is challenging to traditional legal
education. From a pessimist's standpoint, however, it must be
pointed out that change has happened only because every single
movement has had some foundation funding in supporting the
change of legal education.
The only movements that I think have had any real influence
have been those that have had not only the foundation funding, but
also student and faculty bodies committed to them. Some of them
were more successful than others, but the truth is that virtually all
of the movements I have discussed have operated solely on the
periphery. They are still marginal add-ons to legal education, which
is why I am sad to report that much of the core remains the same.
I would like to ask those of you in the room who are students
to think about the extent you might have a broader, better, deeper,
more complex legal education than some of us have had, and what
difference that has made. Do you think of new legal theories, do
you think of new ways to practice law? Do you think of new
questions with which to interrogate each other and your teachers or
do we all have the same diet, carved up slightly differently?
Professor Minow
Well, several questions have been put to you and I am sure you
have questions and comments. But if anyone wants to put on a play
or paint a picture, that is also appropriate. Does anyone want to
come to a mike, or does anyone sitting here in front want to speak?
Audience Member
I teach constitutional law at Suffolk Law School. I have been
convinced for many, many years that many of the problems in law
schools, power relationships, the over-focus on rules, the Socratic
method, would be minimized and more of this interdisciplinary and
self-actualizing learning would take place if we broke up the first-
year classes into small sections, small class sizes.
In other words, it is really a financial issue. The large class
method of instruction is a cheap method of instruction and allows
the universities to drain off a huge chunk of law school tuitions,
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anywhere from ten to forty percent to the university. It has really
been a financial decision that has been made for a hundred years,
that has created so many of the problems we face today. We should
all push our law schools to have smaller units of instruction,
particularly in the basic classes.
A lot of these classroom dynamics may really diminish or
disappear in a seminar. People are much less apt to beat each other
up on the basis of categories or to stereotype when they are in a
room with twenty people. It becomes a much more human
experience. I am just wondering what the panelists' reactions are to
what is really a very simple idea.
Professor Menkel-Meadow
A couple of things.
I agree with you, and I have two comments. First, what you are
describing absolutely can be done. Of course it would be ideal if
it were formally structured in the law school. But to the extent that
law schools cannot afford to have that structure implemented, many
law schools have at least some smaller classes. For example,
students at my law school have at least two of their first-year
courses in small groups. That is the compromise on the financial
front.
I teach one hundred and thirty civil procedure students, and I
do it partially in small groups and I have them introduce them-
selves to each other. Although not every day, I do break the larger
class into smaller groups. The students write complaints together
in groups of four or five. They have to construct a non-adjudicative
solution to some legal problem that I give them in groups of three
or four. I have them speak in groups of three, four, five, six or
seven in a large classroom. I take valuable class time to have them
talk to each other.
Most teachers in this room know about all of this. There are
things that one can do even within the existing structures. I am a
little resistant to those who say the civil procedure environment
may not be the place to do this. Any environment can be used if
one is brave enough and has at least some support through
students. I am also resistant to those who opine that clinicians are
not sharing these different teaching methods. Clinical teachers have
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shared methodologies for thirty years now. 7 There is a great
variety of teaching technologies, methodologies, and approaches,
although I also want to say that there is a form of clinical educa-
tion that has become just as encrusted and not subject to change as
traditional education has, as I see it, even in some of the best
clinics where students are taught to be trial lawyers in some very
traditional, old fashioned adversary ways.
Thus, to the teachers in the room, I say, push the envelopes of
your own forms; to the students in the room I say, think about
what works for you and what does not. The other thing I was
thinking about were the terms of art used to teach. Using art as a
method of teaching is a method that has been employed by the
Esalen retreat for over thirty years. 18 Esalen has shifted from one
modality of learning to another for years as a way of expanding
how one thinks in the mode one is in. One must shift out of it,
draw a picture of something, then see what the picture teaches and
return to more conceptual mores.
What does one learn from the attempt to draw something and
then to put oneself back into the modality that one thinks one is
working in?
Those of you who are students, think about a time of your life
when you really learned something or came to understand some-
thing new. As you had high moments, think about what made you
feel that way, and consider what you could do to bring some of
that into the law school. We are only as stuck as we think we are
in accepting the forms that we are in.
I just have one other observation. One of my heroines is a
wonderful judge in Canada, Rosa Abella.19 She said that we
17 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4; see also Alan M. Lerner, Law and
Lawyering in the Work Place: Building Better Lawyers by Teaching Students to
Exercise Critical Judgment as Creative Problem Solver, 32 AKRON L. REv. 107
(1999).
'8 Esalen, California is an experimental gestalt psychology based retreat
center. See http://www.esalen.org (last visited Mar. 11, 2001).
'9 Rosalie Silberman Abella was Justice of the Canadian Supreme Court. She
was a leader in advancing the human rights movement, particularly women's
rights and the rights of the disabled. Justice Abella also held several public
service positions such as the director of the Institute for Research on Public
Policy, the Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice, and the Canadian
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should consider all the institutions we are involved in, education,
medical care, hospitals, law, and now policing as one of them. If
you compare any picture of those institutions a hundred years ago
with a modem snapshot, every one of them looks very different in
the year 2000 than it did in 1900, except for law.
I am just struck by the fact that courtrooms, law schools, and
the physical spaces of law still look similar. I may be wrong, and
you may have some counter examples in the 'new' architecture,
but even new law schools build old forms.
As the panel was describing some innovations, I was thinking
about some meetings at the Justice Department where police
departments talked about their work on spousal and domestic
violence issues.2 0 I was struck by how many creative exercises
were going on in many different places. This was not the case in
all of them, and there is still a long way to go, but many of the
police departments were quite flexible. Now I am about to say
something totally blasphemous: the police departments were more
flexible than some of my feminist friends, and I was involved with
the domestic violence movement as a feminist twenty-five years
ago. In the recent DOJ-Vera meeting, some of the police officers
were more creative and sensitive than and more conscious about
whom they were approaching and how they were thinking about
what they were doing, than some of my activist friends who have
been making the same arguments for thirty years about arrest and
section of the International Commission of Jurist. See http:\\www.library.ubc.-
ca/spcoll/ubcarch/hdcities9.html#abella (last visited Mar. 5, 2001).
20 See Vera Institute - DOJ Programs, Focus Group on Mediation and
Domestic Violence, Jan. 1999, at http://www.vera.org/main.html. The Vera
Institute of Justice was founded in 1961 by Loiis Schweitzer, a philanthropist,
to help alleviate the overcrowding in jail by helping poor persons with strong
community ties post bail. Id. The Vera Institute, working with the United States
Government, now designs and implements new programs to "encourage just
practices in public services and improve the quality of urban life." Id. As a
response to domestic violence, Vera and the Department of Justice have
implemented a new program by creating a forum where police officers, district
attorneys, judges, and victims' advocates brainstorm in generating and testing
new practices to address the issue. Id.
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incarceration of abusive partners, rather than trying to do what is
best for women and their relationships.2
At that moment I was thinking about what Rosa Abella said,
that lawyers were using the same tropes, the same arguments, the
same expressions, the same physical environments as in the
nineteenth century. And virtually every other institution in our
society has changed. Business has changed more than we have.
Why is that?
Professor Minow
We are grateful for this presentation, and the others made orally
at the conference.
21 See Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of
Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEG. F. 23
(1989).
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